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ABSTRACT
Much debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with humans the ability to infer
others’ mental states, such as desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief task, we
showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a human actor would search for a goal object
where he had last seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no longer there. In
response, Heyes proposed that apes’ looking behavior was guided not by social cognitive
mechanisms but rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use of inanimate controls
to test this alternative submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we implemented the
suggested inanimate control of our previous false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but
showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no signiﬁcant tendency to look to the correct
location. We thus found no evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes’ anticipatory
looks in our false-belief task.
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theory of mind
The ability to infer the mental states of others, such as
their desires and beliefs, is known as theory of mind
(ToM).1 ToM is central to many key facets of human
social life—including our unique forms of communica-
tion, cooperation, and culture—and consequently,
researchers have long sought to determine whether ToM
is also unique to humans.2 Several decades of research
have suggested that great apes, humans’ closest living rel-
atives, as well as some distantly related species (e.g., cor-
vids) are able to infer and track the goals, perception,
and knowledge that motivates others’ actions.3-5 How-
ever, until recently, despite a variety of investigations,
there was no evidence that any nonhuman animals could
understand others’ false beliefs.6-9 Attributing false
beliefs requires recognizing that others’ actions are
guided not by reality but by their beliefs about reality,
even when those beliefs are false. In humans, this ability
has long been seen as the signature of a developed
ToM.10
Adapting a seminal eye-tracking paradigm from
developmental psychology,11 Krupenye, Kano, et al.12
recently showed that great apes could pass a modiﬁed
false belief test. Apes watched videos in which an actor
searched for a goal object. In key events, the actor wit-
nessed the object’s hiding in one of 2 locations, brieﬂy
left the scene, and the object was moved and/or removed
while the actor was gone. Thus, when the actor returned
to search for the object, he now falsely believed that it
was in its original location. Krupenye, Kano, et al.12 used
an infrared eye-tracker to noninvasively monitor apes’
eye movements and map their gaze onto the ﬁlms.
Across 2 experiments, as the actor moved centrally
toward the 2 potential hiding places, apes looked to the
location where the actor had last seen the goal object,
correctly anticipating that the actor would search for the
object where he falsely believed it to be. These ﬁndings
provided the ﬁrst evidence that great apes may be able to
predict others’ actions by inferring their false beliefs.
These results remain open, however, to some alterna-
tive explanations (e.g., refs. 13, 14). One prominent
account, offered by Heyes,14-16 is that apes—as well as
human infants and adults—solve this and other related
tasks not by attributing mental states to the actor but by
submentalizing. Submentalizing is “prediction of behav-
ior by low-level, domain-general psychological pro-
cesses.”14 Commenting speciﬁcally on Krupenye, Kano,
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et al.12 experiment 2, Heyes14 suggested that rather than
tracking where the actor last saw the object, and where
he believed it to be, apes may have simply encoded low-
level properties of the stimuli like “the appearance and
disappearance of the [actor’s] striking green shirt.”
When the actor returned to the scene to search for his
goal object, the green shirt could have served as a
retrieval cue, eliciting a memory of the box that con-
tained the object when the green shirt was last present.
Then, “the orientation of the green object relative to the
boxes and the brick [the goal object] before the green
object’s disappearance could have acted as a contextual
cue priming the apes’ visual search when the green object
reappeared.”
Heyes14 encouraged researchers to control for
domain-general processes in ToM tests by implementing
inanimate controls that mirror the perceptual features of
test stimuli but reduce their agentic qualities. Some evi-
dence from a previous anticipatory looking test
involving an inanimate control already suggests that
submentalizing is not responsible for apes’ performance
in ToM tasks.17 However, to test Heyes’14 proposal that
retrieval and contextual cueing may explain apes’ success
in our false belief task, in the present study we imple-
mented an inanimate control. The submentalizing
hypothesis predicts that, given similar attention, retrieval
and contextual cueing will elicit similar anticipatory
looking patterns in the control as in the original study.
Apes (N D 43) were situated in a testing room and
watched video stimuli on a monitor while an infrared
eye-tracker noninvasively recorded their eye movements
[60 Hz; X120 in WKPRC and X300 in KS; Tobii Tech-
nology AB, Stockholm, Sweden]. In the control test, we
used the same methods as the original study, except that
apes watched different stimuli (Fig. 1). In the original
stimuli, a human actor sought a stone that a costumed
gorilla-like character, King-Kong, had hidden in one of 2
boxes. Created based on Fig. 1 of Heyes,14 control stimuli
were inanimate versions of the original in which
the human actor was swapped out for a green semi-circle
Figure 1. Frames from the inanimate control stimuli. See the video online (https://youtu.be/J9hJBLcHc2A).
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and the King-Kong antagonist for a gray triangle. The
fore- and background features of the control stimuli
were drawn as similarly as possible to the original stim-
uli. In the critical test trials, the green semi-circle was
present while the goal object, a stone, hid under one of
the 2 boxes. The green shape then left the scene and,
while away, the stone was moved and/or removed. The
key question was whether, upon the green shape’s return,
apes would spontaneously look to the Target box that
contained the stone when the green shape was last pres-
ent, as opposed to the other Distractor box.
Apes closely tracked all key events (Fig. 2). However,
despite a much larger sample, just 22 of 43 apes (51.16%)
looked to one of the boxes during the anticipatory phase,
as compared with 22 of 30 apes (73.33%) in the original
study (Table 1). Moreover, unlike in the original study,
among those that did make looks, there was no
signiﬁcant tendency to look ﬁrst to the Target over the
Distractor, overall (14 of 22 ﬁrst looks to the target, p D
0.28, 2-tailed binomial test; Table 1) or in each condition
(FB1: 6 of 11 ﬁrst looks to the target, p D 1.0; FB2: 8 of
11 ﬁrst looks to the target, p D 0.23, 2-tailed binomial
test). Additionally, an ANOVA investigating viewing
times revealed no signiﬁcant looking bias toward either
the Target or Distractor, and a notably smaller effect size
(F(1,37) D 0.31, p D 0.57, h2 D 0.008; Fig. 2). The other
main and interaction effects were also not signiﬁcant
(ps>0.05). Finally, analyzing only apes who participated
in both the control and original studies (N D 26)
revealed the same pattern of results; i.e. no signiﬁcant
bias in ﬁrst looks (p D 0.33 in a binomial test) or viewing
times (F(1,20) D 1.03, p D 0.32, h2 D 0.05 in ANOVA)
in the control test.
The submentalizing hypothesis predicts that, given
similar attention, retrieval and contextual cueing will
elicit similar anticipatory looking patterns in inanimate
controls as in false belief test stimuli. In contrast to this
prediction, we found that, although apes closely tracked
key events as they did in the original study, they made
markedly fewer looks to the Target or Distractor loca-
tions. Additionally, those that did make looks showed no
signiﬁcant tendency to look longer at the Target or the
Figure 2. Viewing times (msec § SE) for key events during the belief-induction and the anticipatory-looking phases of the false-belief 1
(FB1) and false-belief 2 (FB2) conditions.
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Distractor. Although somewhat more apes looked ﬁrst to
the Target than the Distractor (particularly in the FB2
condition), this tendency was not signiﬁcant overall or in
either condition. Moreover, and critically, the submen-
talizing hypothesis is only viable if it can account for suc-
cessful performance across both conditions. Taken
together, in the absence of the most prominent agentic
features, apes did not automatically exhibit comparable
anticipatory looking patterns to those exhibited in our
false belief test. These results suggest that the domain-
general processes implicated by the submentalizing
hypothesis, namely retrieval and contextual cueing, are
insufﬁcient to explain apes’ ability to correctly anticipate
the actions of a mistaken agent in our task.12 Determin-
ing the exact cognitive mechanism that facilitated their
successful action prediction (e.g., perspective-taking,7
rule-based behavior prediction,13 etc.) and the nature of
the representations involved in this mechanism,18-21
however, remain key areas for future research.
Participants and methods
A total of 43 great apes (14 bonobos, Pan paniscus, 22
chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, 7 orangutans, Pongo abe-
lii) participated in this study, 26 of which had partici-
pated in the original study. Apes were born in captivity
and lived with conspeciﬁcs in enriched naturalistic envi-
ronments at the Wolfgang Kohler Primate Research
Center (WKPRC) in Leipzig, Germany, and at Kuma-
moto Sanctuary (KS) in Kumamoto, Japan. Animal hus-
bandry and research protocol complied with local
guidelines, which strictly adhere to international stand-
ards and the national laws of Japan and Germany.
See reference12 for full details of the procedure of the
original study, which the present study followed. Partici-
pants experienced 2 familiarization trials on one day and
a single test trial on the next. In familiarization trials,
while the green shape was present, the stone moved
either under the left or right box (one familiarization of
each type per subject), the green shape’s orientation
changed, and then the boxes ﬂashed and slowly moved
toward the green shape (4.5 seconds of boxes ﬂashing
and bell ringing; reﬂecting the anticipatory phase in
which, in the original stimuli, the human actor reached
toward the ﬂashing boxes and then pulled in the tray
that they sat on).
Test trials were one of 2 conditions: false-belief 1
(FB1) or false-belief 2 (FB2), with half of participants
assigned to each condition (between-subjects design). In
FB1, while the green shape was present, the stone moved
ﬁrst under one box and then under the other (and then
the gray triangle turned to the ﬁrst box). The green shape
then left the scene and, while away, the stone was
removed. In FB2, while the green shape was present, the
stone moved under the ﬁrst box. The green shape then
left the scene and, while away, the stone moved to the
second box and was then removed. In both conditions,
the green shape then returned, changed its orientation,
and the boxes began ﬂashing and moving toward the
green shape (again 4.5 seconds of boxes ﬂashing and bell
ringing). We counterbalanced across subjects the order
of familiarization trials (stone on Left then Right or Right
then Left) and whether, in the test trials, the Target was
the left or right box.
As in the original study, the Target box was deﬁned as
the box where the green shape would falsely believe the
stone to be located if it were an agent (i.e., the box where
the stone was located before the green shape left the
scene). The other box was the Distractor. Apes’ eye-move-
ment responses (ﬁrst looks and viewing times) to each
scene feature (e.g., Target and Distractor boxes) were
coded automatically in the Tobii Studio software (ver.
3.2.1) based on Areas-Of-Interest (AOIs; see Fig. 1R). As
in the original study, we used a binomial test to determine
whether apes looked ﬁrst to the Target box signiﬁcantly
above chance, and an ANOVA to determine whether
viewing times differed signiﬁcantly between Target/Dis-
tractor locations, conditions (FB1 vs FB2), or species.
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Table 1. Number of ﬁrst looks in the original and control studies.
Condition Target Distractor Neither Total
Original FB1 8 2 6 16
FB2 9 3 2 14
Total 17 5 8 30
Control FB1 6 5 10 21
FB2 8 3 11 22
Total 14 8 21 43
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